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ABSTRACT. Current models of profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) financing assume that the 
ratio in which profits are shared may be different from the ratio the financier's capital 
bears to the total capital of the firm, which is the ratio in which losses must be shared. 
This can be better justified as a growth promoting policy than as an instrument for 
ensuring distributive justice. 
In a system where interest and PLS financing co-exist, the aggregate profit-sharing 
ratio is a function of the overall rate of return on investment, rate of interest, degree of 
leverage, and risk premium. PLS financing is more profitable to financiers in the long 
run than interest financing. 
 
Introduction 
Islam prohibits interests. Participation in the financing of a businesses is possible 
only on a profit and loss sharing (PLS) basis. The ramifications of this change, at the 
theoretical and applied levels, are in a process of continuous exploration in Islamic 
economics. Discussions on how to structure and operate a sharing system have not been 
infrequent in the literature. Yet surprisingly the basic question of the determination of 
profit and loss sharing ratios and some of the related issues remain by and large 
unresolved. Cursory explanations have been many, but a formal integrated analysis of 
the subject has rarely been attempted. 
 
The present paper makes a preliminary effort at filling this gap in the context of an 
economy where finance is available both on the profit sharing basis and on the basis of 
interest. Its main objectives are: 
 
(i) To analyze the process of ratios determination at macro and micro levels, 
showing how demand and supply of investment funds play their role, and 
changes in different variables may affect the equilibrium ratio, and 
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(ii) To indicate some of the implications of the sharing arrangement, in particular 
the examination of its profitability for the financiers as compared to lending on 
interest. 
 
Broadly speaking, the ratio question has three main aspects: juridical, economic, 
and accounting. Each is important and intimately related to the others. However, we 
shall primarily be concerned with the first two aspects. 
There has been some controversy on the issue of profit and loss sharing ratios in 
Islamic jurisprudence.1 We shall briefly present below the different viewpoints on the 
subject without going into the finer juristic points. We shall explain the position 
contemporary Islamic economists have taken as a matter of near agreement, and which we 
have also maintained, for constructing a sharing model. This position allows, a 
'divergence' between the profit and loss sharing ratios of a financier. This is justified on 
the ground that the financier supplies only capital whereas the owner of an enterprise, who 
has also invested his own capital in the enterprise, supplies both capital and work. But a 
problem arises when this principle is applied to a modern joint stock company. The 
owners, in this case the share holders, supply only capital, work being done by hired 
labour including managers. Should those supplying finance to such a company be allowed 
to share its profits in a ratio different from the one in which they share its losses? 
Current Position 
Profit and loss sharing - in short PLS-mode is, have been designed, especially in the 
area of interest-free banking, on a principle which in fact is characteristic of 
mudarabah. Here one assigns his resources to the productive sector through an 
entrepreneur in exchange for a share in the return on that investment, financial losses, if 
any, falling entirely on the former (Ariff, p.6). Jurists generally agree that in mudarabah 
the PLS ratios of the financier are to be different and capital can be contributed in the 
form of money or money's worth. Furthermore, the financier has no right to participate 
in the business decision making (Ghazali, pp.84-85). 
However, modern business situations are in most cases different from pure 
mudarabah in the sense that owners of the firm - the entrepreneurs - contribute a 
substantial portion of the capital K employed in its production activity. Because of this 
invariably 'mixed' character of real world cases, a straightforward application of the 
juridical principles of shirkah or mudarabah becomes difficult. 
One comes across, in a broad way, two types of opinion about shirkah arrangements 
among the jurists. The Hanafis and Hanbalis with some supporters among the Shafiis 
maintain that while the suppliers of capital will always bear the loss in proportion to 
their financial contribution, they are free to negotiate among themselves for their profit 
sharing ratios. Evidently the implication is that their profit and loss sharing ratios could 
be different. This we may term as the 'ratio divergence' approach. It makes no 
distinction between shirkah and mudarabah so far as the profit and loss sharing 
principle is concerned. In contrast, the Malikis and most of the Shafiis are of the view 
that, in shirkah, profit and loss are both to be shared in the same ratio - 
K
L
=s , L being 
the financier's contribution to the total capital K. This one may call as the 'ratio identity' 
approach. 
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Islamic economists have almost always preferred the 'ratio divergence' approach for 
erecting their PLS models, and for two reasons. First, they claim, at least by implication, 
that the bulk of juridical opinion seems to support this approach. One need not dispute 
the contention. But since the other viewpoint - the ratio identity approach - has some 
important adherents among Islamic jurists the exercise of discretion in favour of ratio 
divergence must be supported by more convincing economic arguments than has so far 
been done. 
 
This brings us to the proponents' second reason. They argue that profit is the result 
of the combined effort of capital and enterprise.2 Hence, keeping the profit and loss 
sharing ratios equal for the financier would be unfair to the entrepreneur. It will 
discriminate in favour of the dormant supplier of funds. This is straight logic. Yet it has 
far-reaching implications. 
 
The argument requires that s must always be less than 
K
L  This sets a constraint on 
the bargaining power of the financiers and may sometimes be welcome to that extent. 
But if the gap s-=
K
Lg  is to provide for part of the compensation for the 
entrepreneurial endeavour, one may face serious difficulties. 
 
To begin with, can we ensure that the magnitude of g remains only fair? It is 
difficult to rely on market arbitration or design state intervention for the purpose. Again, 
can the beneficiaries of the ratios' gap earnings or at least their majority always be 
shown to deserve the advantage? Presumably this may be possible, in a broad way, in 
case of proprietory businesses or closely-held small companies. But it is extremely 
difficult to identify the entrepreneurial services, more so the person performing them, in 
a large multiproduct corporation. The ratio gap earnings will go to the stockholders but 
their vast majority takes no more active part in business than the outside financiers. 
Should we then discriminate between the two? 
 
Furthermore, in large corporations there is no work done by any of the functionaries 
for which remuneration is not prefixed and deducted from gross revenues before 
distributable profits are arrived at. In the event, will not ratio divergence lead to 
duplication of payments? 
 
Last, but by no means the least, not a few consider s as a policy variable. For 
example, it is suggested that s may be manipulated by the central bank of a country for 
controlling credit (Uzair, pp. 48-50). Efficacy of this proposal as a policy instrument 
apart, it clearly comes into conflict with the juridical position that s is open to 
negotiations among the parties (Ariff, p. 14). Furthermore, will not a sectoral 
administration of s e.g. in banking alone be discriminatory and a global one almost 
impossible to enforce? 
 
The questions we have raised above are difficult to answer. But these are the 
questions that have to be answered satisfactorily before the ratio divergence approach 
can be applied without discretion. 
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To us the case for ratio divergence seems rather weak on grounds of social justice in 
the present day business circumstances. Perhaps one can support it better as an 
expedient promotive of growth. The proposition 
K
L
<s
 may work as an incentive to 
produce and enhance the scope for accumulation, thus helping the process of economic 
development in the Islamic countries short in enterprise and capital. 
 
However, the success of the policy depends, among other things, on how far the 
surplus of business earnings - g x profits is retained for capital formation. In case it 
leaks out largely into the income and consumption streams, ratio divergence may tend to 
(i) increase distributional inequalities, (ii) distort demand and therefore investment 
patterns, and (iii) encourage, like interest finance, the destabilizing forces in the 
economy. Policies aimed at minimizing such leakages must be devised. Appropriate 
fiscal measures may help. 
 
But at present, given the postulate of divergence between the profit and loss sharing 
ratios in interest-free finance, let us examine briefly the process of their determination in 
the economy. 
 
Macro-Level Analysis 
Normally business as a whole is not expected to suffer losses, though individual 
firms may not always earn profits. At the macro-level then the problem is one of 
determining the profit sharing ratio with the constraint 
K
L
<s
 . 
In Islamic economics one often comes across the observation that the profit sharing 
ratio is determined by the forces of demand and supply of investible funds in the 
economy (Siddiqi 1983, p.125). But this has remained largely in the nature of a cause 
and effect statement. There has seldom been an effort either to identify the relevant 
variables of the process or to demonstrate precisely how the apparatus would work to 
establish the equilibrium ratio. 
 
Again, there is a tendency, even if veiled, to strike a parallel with the process of 
interest rate determination.3 This must be resisted. For s is a ratio for sharing, not a 
price like the rate of interest (Ariff, p.22). Furthermore, unlike the case of interest, the 
element of risk and uncertainty plays a dominant role in the determination of s. For 
these and other reasons one cannot apply here the demand and supply tools in a 
straightforward mechanistic way. 
 
Rather, we have to connect s with the overall rate of profit in the economy and 
integrate the notion of a risk premium into the analysis frame to see how the demand 
and supply forces may operate in this case. For the purpose of this exercise, elementary 
in nature, we assume: 
 
1. That the PLS system operates in competition with the customary institutions 
providing funds on interest.4 
2. That both firms and financiers attempt maximizing their profits, subject of course 
to the ethical constraints of Islam. 
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3. That there are no taxes or transaction cost. 
4. That all productive investments are equally risky, hence the risk premium is the 
same in all cases.5 
5. That profit expectations of the owners and the financiers concerning a given 
investment K as well as their risk estimates coincide. 
6. That there are no market imperfections to impede the processes of adjustment. 
 
Now, let us list the symbols - including those already introduced - that we shall use 
for facilitating the discussion in this and the following sections. 
 
K total capital employed in a firm's business 
K0 owners contribution in K (K0 = equity) 
L financier's share in K (K = K0 + L) 
p profit measured as gross revenue minus all contractual payments and capital 
consumption but including interest. 
s* financiers' ratio for sharing profit attributable to L 
l financial leverage )
K
L( =l  
s proportion of profit going to the financiers (s = s* l) 
r rate of profit on total investment )
K
Pr( =  
ri rate of interest 
r0 rate of profit on K0 under PLS finance 
i
or  rate of profit on K0 under interest finance 
rL rate of profit on L under PLS finance 
a risk premium fraction 
x = i
or  - r 
y = r0 - r 
 
All the rates and ratios are per unit. The absolute values of a variable (K, K0, L, or 
P) may be added for an aggregative analysis. 
 
In financing systems with and without interest operating side by side in the 
economy, the main criterion for the firms in choosing their source of external finance is 
assumed to be the rate of profit they expect to earn on the owner's capital (K0) in each 
case. However, there is a flaw in this viewpoint. 
 
The firms are aware that under the PLS system the risk of enterprise would be 
transferred from them to the financiers in the same ratio as L/K. In contrast, they have to 
bear the entire risk in the case of interest finance. In fact, it tends to increase with 
borrowings because of rising fixed interest commitments. In view of this vital difference 
between the alternatives the firms may normally be willing to allow the PLS financiers a 
profit sharing ratio that would leave with them (firms) sufficient earnings for the owners 
to have a rate of return on their investment K0 comparable with the one that customary 
finance would permit after deducting from profits not only interest but an appropriate 
risk premium as well.6 For the firms the minimal requirement for preferring the PLS 
finance would thus be: 
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(I - s) P ≥ P - ri l K - a l K 
Simplifying we get, 
 
(1)                                                         )r(
r i
a+
l
£s  
 
On similar reasoning, the financiers may be willing to take a share of profits which 
is more than, or at least equal to, the interest income plus reasonable compensation for 
risk, i.e. 
 
s P ≥ P - ri l K + a l K 
 
which reduces to 
(2)                                                         )r(
r i
a+
l
³s  
 
Given our assumptions, in equilibrium 
(3)                                                         )r(
r i
a+
l
=s  
 
This is a situation where the firms will not tend to prefer one source of finance to 
another except because of religious motivation. It also shows that the profit sharing ratio 
in the PLS system of our construct is primarily a function of four variables. 
 
s = f(r, ri, a, K)                  (4) 
 
The relationships between r, ri and a on the one hand, and their interconnections 
with the forces of demand and supply concerning investible funds on the other are of the 
same sort as we have them in secular economics. Also, the processes of their 
determination or modification due to variations in business and social environment 
operate along the customary lines. But demand and supply presumably neither 
determine nor are determined by the profit sharing ratio s in the strict sense. Rather, 
decisions on K are to be such that s remains in harmony with the other variables of the 
system. 
 
Setting, 
 
l (ri + a) = b       a constant, in equation   (3) 
 
We get 
s r = b                                                        (5) 
 
The curve is a rectangular hyperbola with centre (0, 0) and is convex from below. It 
shows that s is inversely related to r. By varying the value of the parameter b we have a 
system of curves for explaining the nature and implications of relationships underlying 
the function. Figure 1 presents a set of such curves. 
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Some of the conclusions that follow from this simple diagram are: 
 
1. Other things being equal marginal reduction in s declines for equal increases in r. 
The implication is that the resistance of the financiers to downward adjustments 
in their profit sharing ratio tends to increase even when profit expectations may 
be rising. On the other hand, they are likely to insist on a more than 
proportionate rise in s when profit expectations are generally declining. This is 
clear from the movement along any of the curves. 
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ b-=
¶
s¶
2rr
 
2. For any given value of B = B0 and r = r¢  a point like A above the relevant curve 
indicates a s more favourable to financiers and a point such as A' below the curve, 
a s more advantageous to the firms. Both depict states of incompatibility and 
forces will tend to set in motion to bring s back on to the curve. At point A the 
financiers would be willing to supply more of funds under PLS relative to the 
firms' demand. Competition among the financiers will eventually restore s to the 
equilibrium level on the curve. Opposite is likely to happen at point A'. Supply of 
funds will tend to be less than their demand and firms will compete with each other 
until s is forced up appropriately. In this way one can see demand and supply play 
a role in keeping s around the equilibrium level. 
3. As r on the one hand and l, ri, and a together on the other, have opposite effects 
on s they may, in a dynamic situation, neutralise each other's influence such that 
s remains constant along a line ss  even when profit expectations fluctuate. 
4. For given profit expectations, s may vary directly with the net change in ri, a, 
and l along a line such as r r . 
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5. Given l, s changes directly with variations in (ri + a) relative to r. 
6. With (ri + a) constant, s varies directly with fluctuations in l relative to r. 
7. l, r, and a remaining unchanged s varies directly with the rate of interest ri. 
 
With these conclusions, let us turn to the analysis of the problem of profit sharing 
ratio at the micro-level. 
 
Firm's Equilibrium 
Given profit expectation, the firm will be in equilibrium when it maximizes the rate 
of return r0 on the owners' part of its investment. Here, the problem is of finding the 
relevant combination of s and l. Putting in equation (3) 
 
b
r
ri =a+  a constant 
we have 
s = bl (o < b < 1)   (6) 
 
This shows that s varies directly with l in a linear relationship and a 'family' of 
straight lines passing through the origin can be obtained by varying the slope b. Any 
line of the set such as the one with b = b0 in Fig. 2.2 below may be viewed for the firm 
as the supply schedule of L expressed in terms of )
K
L(=l . 
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Notice that the combinations of s and l along the line are only such that keep rL 
unchanged. This clearly follows from equation (2). Thus, for given rL, the supply of L 
for an individual firm is perfectly elastic despite - indeed because of - s varying with l. 
 
However, in PLS finance, as in that based on interest, the firm may not push up l 
infinitely. Even though the rate of profit r0 on the owners' investment tends to rise as l 
increases the firm may not like to reduce the proportion of K0 in K beyond a limit where 
its own employable financial resources may tend to become idle. This sets a minimum 
level for absolute earnings, say M, that must be available for the owners. Liquidity and 
income retention considerations may also influence the requirement for M. Under the 
circumstances the firm may seek a combination of s and l that would be compatible 
with M. Symbolically we have: 
(1 - s) p ≥ M 
or 
P
M1-£s    (7) 
 
For given P, the equation 
P
M1-=s  gives the demand schedule of the firm for L 
which, like the supply schedule, can be interpreted in terms of l. As M increases L 
decreases, other things being equal. Thus, l varies inversely with M. This is clear from 
the equality of the demand and supply schedules. In a state of equilibrium, combining 
(6) and (7), we have 
b
1
P
M1 úû
ù
êë
é -=l     (8) 
l and M being the variables, the inverse function is: 
 
M = P(1 - bl) and pbM -=
l¶
¶  
It follows from (7) that the relationship between s and M is linear with a negative 
slope 
P
1
-  The slope varies directly with P and a 'set' of lines passes through the point 
s = 1. One such line is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
 
It is interesting to see at this stage how the inequality s < li is built into the micro 
aspect of a PLS system. Islamic economists invariably maintain that profit must be, in 
the first instance, apportioned to L in accordance with the value of l i.e. profit 
attributable to L is lP. It is from lP that the financiers get an agreed proportion s* 
(Siddiqi 1978, pp. 36-37). The procedure sets sP = s*lP or s = s*l. Comparing this 
with (5) we have s* = b as well. Notice that s* and l being fractions s < l and s < s* 
but s* 
£
³
 l. 
 
22                                                                         Zubair Hasan  
For a given s, s* varies inversely with l. In fact it is the same thing as inverse of 
the function in (6) now taking b (= s*) as variable. We may have a set of equi - s curves 
for different values of the parameter s as shown in Fig. 2.3. It follows that there can be 
circumstances where a firm may expect a reduction in s* as it seeks more funds under 
PLS arrangement though such a change is of little consequence unless s is reduced. Fig. 
2.3 also shows that for any l, s* varies directly with s. Again, s* may remain constant 
if changes in s and l balance each other's influence. 
 
Fig. 2.4 translates the relationship shown in Fig. 2.1 in terms of s*. We find 
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
l
=s
P
M11* which gives a linear relationship between s
* and M with a negative 
slope 
P
1
l
-  . Since P> lP the slope of the demand curve in Fig. 2.1 is kept greater than 
that in Fig. 2.4. 
 
The equilibrium of the firm is shown by the continuous line circuit starting from M0 
in Fig. 2.1. Passing through the points E, F, G and H it gives interconnected values of 
the variables as s0, l0, s0  and back to M0, all the four held in mutual balance as balls 
placed in a bowl. A change in M, s, or l may start a chain reaction until a similar 
equilibrium circuit is reestablished. In a simple illustration, if l changes from lo to l1 in 
Fig. 2.2 showing a reduction in 
K
L , the firm will have larger M (= M1), the profit 
sharing ratio of the financier falling to s1 but s* remaining unchanged, the equilibrium 
point in Fig. 2.3 shifts on to a lower equi - s curve. The demand curve in Fig. 2.4 shifts 
to the right because its slope involving l has changed such that s* remains the same. 
The new equilibrium circuit is shown by the broken line; its portion between Fig. 2.3 
and Fig. 2.4 runs over the old circuit. 
 
Attention may be drawn to a matter of significance at the micro level in arranging 
PLS finance for business. It is a consequence of the changes in 
K
L .7 
In customary finance the rate of interest cuts off the financier with a periodic 
payment for his contribution L to the total investment in a firm's business. It leaves him 
unconcerned about (i) the initial volume of K, and (ii) any subsequent changes in K 
unless the security of his contribution L is threatened. 
 
However, in a PLS system both these matters assume importance for the non- 
owner financier. It is always necessary, though seldom easy, that the financiers and the 
owners agree at the time of making a PLS contract on the estimate of K employed or to 
be employed in the firm's business or required for a project. This is essential to give the 
financier a precise idea of his loss sharing ratio l=
K
L , and negotiate, with the 
knowledge of risk involved, for a profit sharing ratio. This brings into focus the 
importance of the accounting valuations in PLS financing, especially in case of a going 
concern.8 
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Even when the initial volume of K is settled, and the financiers' contribution to it 
decided, their reaction to subsequent changes in K relative to L remains uncertain. 
 
For any s* agreed upon, if later variations in K leave the expected rate of profit r 
unchanged the same has no effect on rL. However, if a reduction in K, given L takes 
place that would raise l the loss sharing ratio. So the financier may oppose the change. 
On the other hand, he may welcome an increase in K under the circumstances, for that 
would reduce l without decreasing rL. 
 
But the situation becomes complicated as profit expectations change with variations 
in K. If a reduction in K promises to raise r, as may for instance be the case under 
schemes of rationalization, the financier may not resist the change provided he 
considers the expected increase in rL adequate enough to compensate him for a 
simultaneous increase in l. The reverse is true if r is expected to fall. 
 
Likewise, if increase in K is expected to go with a reduction in r, the financier may 
or may not oppose the change depending on how he evaluates the resultant reduction in 
l - L remaining fixed - compared to the likely fall in rL. 
 
Relative Profitability 
Doubts have recently been raised regarding the success of the PLS institutions 
operating in competition with those working on the basis of interest. It is suspected that 
the former are likely to be much less profitable and may tend to vanish in the long run 
unless efforts are made to sustain them through strategies of non-financial sort of 
supplementary business (Nienhaus, 1983). 
 
We shall argue that the logic of a PLS system negates such a presumption. The 
incorporation of the risk premium factor in the process of arriving at the equilibrium 
profit sharing ratio s through equations (1) to (3) is clearly indicative of superior 
profitability expectation for providing funds on a PLS basis. The proposition further 
unfolds itself in another connection i.e. the leverage effects discussed below. 
 
One distinctive feature of interest finance is that leverage the use of term loans as 
part of business finance - normally tends to raise the return rio on the owners' 
investment, relative to the overall rate of profit r. In other words, rio tends to be greater 
than r. 
Assuming that profit expectations are realized,9 we may set 
K
P
K)1(
KrPX
i
-
l-
l-
=  
which reduces to 
)rr(),rr(
1
X ii >-l-
l=    (9) 
Given (r - ri), x varies directly with l and at an increasing rate 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
l-
-
=
l¶
¶
l-
-
=
l¶
¶
3
i
2
2
2
i
)1(
)rr(2Xand,
)1(
rrX  
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But as l increases, the risk of the owners also increases (Baumol, p.461) and 
presumably at a faster rate, after a point, than the rise in rio. Therefore, a stage is likely 
to be reached soon when additional borrowing on interest may become more risky than 
profitable for the owners. Leverage cannot be pushed beyond the limits of safety. This is 
a well known fact in the interest based business finance. 
 
The ratio divergence approach by keeping s < l provides for a leverage effect to 
the benefit of the owners in a PLS system as well. To formalize matters, we may write: 
 
K
P
K)1(
K)1(Y -
l-
s-
=  
Simplifying we get 
)1(
)(rY
l-
s-l
=     (10) 
 
Substituting in this the value of s from (3) we have: 
)rr(),rr(
)1(
Y ii a+>a--l-
l
=   (11) 
 
A comparison of equations (9) and (11) shows that the leverage gains for the 
owners are likely to be smaller under PLS finance, the excess of x over y being 
measured by the ratio 
)1( l-
la . Also, the rate of increase in y is smaller 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
l-
a--
=
l¶
¶
>
l¶
¶
3
i
2
2
2
2
)1(
)rr(2yX . However, the owners are compensated for the short 
fall in profit by the transfer of risk to the financiers. 
 
It comes about that PLS finance has two distinct features. First it grants to the 
financiers a higher rate of return on their funds than the rate of interest, the difference 
being equal to a [From (3)]. There is, unlike interest finance, virtually no limit on 
leverage, save M which operates in any case. This promises more business for the PLS 
financiers. Thus, higher return than the rate of interest on investment funds L and 
greater volume of business creates visions of superior profitability of the system for the 
financiers. 
There is another way of looking at the matter, and in a somewhat broader 
perspective. 
In secular economics the equilibrium rate of profit r for the system is supposed to be 
composed of two main elements (i) rate of interest ri and (ii) a risk premium fraction say 
s*. Thus, r = ri + s* In the PLS system we have built, the risk premium ratio is reduced 
to a, (a < a*). This is implicit in our formulation 
r
)r( i a+l=s . For s being less than 
l we have 1
r
ri <a+  or ri + a < r. 
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Putting the difference a* - a = m as a balancing element, we have 
ri + a + m = r     (12) 
 
If interest were completely abolished from the Islamic world, ri and a would merge 
into a single entity, say a', such that in the pure PLS system we would have 
r = a' + m    (13) 
 
The a' fraction of profit would be shared between the financiers and the firms, the 
latter also getting the m fraction. To illustrate, as total profits P = rK, the firms receive 
 
(1 - s) p = [(1 - l) a' + m] K   (14) 
and the financiers get 
s P = a' lK     (15) 
 
The mK portion in the firms' share of profit may be viewed as the reward for 
entrepreneurial services in mudarabah or as the surplus available for other purposes 
such as research and development, depending on specific situations. 
 
Dividing (14) on both sides by (1 - l) K and solving we get the rate of return on 
owners' investment K0 as 
)1(
mrro l-
l
+=     (16) 
The leverage effect thus raises r0 over r by the fraction 
)1(
m
l-
l  without involving 
additional risk. 
 
Similarly, from (15) the rate of return rL on the financiers' investment turns out to be 
a¢=
l
s
K
P      (17) 
As a' rL = a' would certainly be greater than ri if interest were prevalent, we return 
to our earlier conclusions concerning relative profitability of the two systems from the 
viewpoint of financiers. 
 
It follows that a PLS system is likely to be more attractive for both the firms and the 
financiers, more so in the long run when transition difficulties are over, the system 
attains maturity, and the people have experienced the advantage. It promises leverage 
benefits to the firms free of risk and a return higher than the rate of interest to the 
financiers. There is probably an additional advantage. Fluctuations in r0 are likely to be 
smaller than in rio as y < x and 
l¶
¶
<
l¶
¶ Xy  For this reason PLS operations may have a 
smaller destabilizing potential for the economy as a whole compared to financing on 
interest. 
The difficulty with PLS finance is not that its relative usefulness is suspect in 
principle. Rather, it may lie in the area of administrative alertness required for its 
successful operation. 
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Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned above, current models in PLS financing usually rest on ratio 
divergence approach that emanates essentially from the principle of mudarabah. We 
have attempted to demonstrate how the profit sharing ratio s is likely to be determined 
K
L  always being the financiers' loss sharing ratio. In the process we have touched upon a 
few other issues. Our main conclusions are: 
 
1. The ratio divergence approach to PLS finance raises a number of important but 
perplexing questions which have not so far been adequately considered, much 
less answered. Perhaps one can support this approach better as a growth 
promoting policy than as an instrument for ensuring distributive justice in view 
of modern forms of business organization. 
2. In a system where interest and PLS financing exist side by side, the 
determination of profit sharing ratio is primarily a function of the overall rate of 
profit on investment, the prevailing rate of interest, the degree of leverage and 
the risk premium estimates. The forces of demand for and supply of investible 
funds operate through their influence on these variables and keep the profit 
sharing ratio in harmony with them. 
3. For individual firms, minimum requirement for absolute amount of earnings on 
the demand side and the proportion of L in K on the supply side tend to settle the 
equilibrium profit sharing ratio, other things remaining the same. Problems 
between the owners and non-owner financiers may arise on the issues of initial 
capitalization of the firm or the project, and the reaction of the financiers to 
subsequent changes there in are difficult to predict. The accounting aspect of 
PLS financing assumes significance in these matters. 
4. Ratio divergence is likely to generate the same sort of destabilizing forces in the 
economy - though at a smaller scale - as interest finance creates by magnifying 
profits (losses) through leverage. 
5. PLS financing is likely to be more profitable in the long run from the financiers' 
viewpoint as compared to interest finance. 
 
These conclusions may not be entirely new, but the way they have been deduced 
and given form here is probably fresh. Some of the assumptions of the model may not 
seem realistic. But they are of a simplifying nature. Their removal would complicate the 
analysis but would hardly affect its broad conclusions. Again, the use of ratios instead 
of absolute values may have made the discussion at some places a bit less convenient to 
follow but it has certainly enhanced the range of the argument without consuming more 
space. For a single relative variation can indicate and summarize more than one absolute 
change. 
 
                      Determination of Profit and Loss Sharing Ratios in Interest-free Business Finance                       27 
Notes 
(1) The main sources on the subject are in Arabic. Some literature is also available in Urdo. One 
reliable and useful discussion has recently been published in English (M.N. Siddiqi, 
Partnership and Profit-sharing in Islamic Law, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1985). 
 
(2) It is interesting to note that while some Islamic economists consider capital and enterprise as a 
composite production factor (e.g. Uzair, Mohammad, Interest-free Banking, Royal Book 
Company, Karachi, 1978, p.5), the popular ratio divergence approach rests on a separation of 
the two, at least conceptually. 
 
(3) The argument seems to run as follows: If the interest and profit sharing systems of finance are 
competitive, in equilibrium PLS financiers must expect a rate of return on their investment L 
equal to the rate of interest appropriately adjusted for the risk and default factors. Also, for 
any such rate of return there must be some sharing ratio of profit which gives that rate. 
Therefore, interest rate and sharing ratio must be determined in an identical manner. 
 
       Even if one concedes the argument, the process how s is determined still remains to be 
explained. 
 
      But there is a more fundamental objection. The argument rests on the ratio identity approach. 
But if 
K
L
=s , the problem of determining s does not arise. It assumes significance only under 
ratio divergence where 
K
L
¹s
. The equality makes the above argument grossly inadequate if 
not entirely redundant. For 
K
L
<s  reduces the profit PLS financiers may expect on L and 
locks the expectations with s in a circular relationship. 
 
(4) This remains a realistic assumption until interest is completely abolished in Muslim societies. At 
present the influence of interest rate on the determination of profit sharing ratio cannot be 
ignored, though we have relaxed this assumption for a moment at a later stage in the discussion 
to focus on some implications of ratio divergence in a completely interest-free economy. 
 
(5) It is the same as resorting to an averaging process which economists use so often in 
aggregative analysis. 
 
(6) Nienhaus has altogether ignored this vital adjustment in deriving his conclusions regarding the 
relative profitability of PLS finance (Nienhaus, Volker, Profitability of Islamic PLS Banks: 
Problems and Prospects, Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jeddah, 
Summer 1983, pp. 37-47). 
 
(7) Compare the discussion here with that in Nienhaus. He altogether ignores the consequences of 
such a change in his comments. Nienhaus, Volker, Review of M.N. Siddiqi's Banking 
Without Interest, Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, Vol. 1, No. 2 Winter 1984, 
pp.90-91. 
 
(8) There must also be an agreement, at least in a broad way, on the accounting principles and 
procedures for ascertaining the profit to be shared between the owners and the financiers of 
the firm. 
(9) For if expectations fail, the more expost profits fall short of exante estimates the greater is the 
burden of interest bearing finance for the owners (leverage given) and more relieving for them 
are the consequences of PLS finance. 
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